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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A ComPARTIvE STUDY. VOL. 3. (Special Obligations:
Modification and Discharge of Obligations). By Ernst Rabel. Chicago: Callaghan
& Company, 1950. Pp. xlvi, 611. $12.50.
This is the third volume of Dr. Rabel's exhaustive study of Comparativc Conflict
of Laws. The earlier volumes have been widely acclaimed.' As Professor Dean
has said, Rabel's work when completed, will be the "most comprehensive study of
the Conflict of Laws in English." 2 The author has undertaken to examine the
Conflict of Laws throughout the world in the light of comparative law principles.
For the average American lawyer, Comparative Law is a closed book which he
seemingly has no immediate need to open. Yet we do not have to be "internationalists" to realize that the second half of the present century is likely to be one in
which legal systems in their entirety will be subjected to increasing criticism as a
result of what comparative law studies such as Dr. Rabel's reveal. Some have predicted that we are on the verge of a golden age of Comparative Law. So far as
the Conflict of Laws is concerned, the American lawyer who might believe that
"things in general were settled forever" by the blackletter of the Restatement will
be shaken when he reads Dr. Rabel's volumes. They constitute a sort of cold
shower and rough toweling for narrow legal provincialism or nationalism. "Contrast
with another legal system may reveal new values. This is one of the merits of the
comparative method. Foreign law serves as a searchlight to bring out beauty and
8
blot alike. It makes us aware not only of defects but also of hidden virtues."
The present volume carries into the field of special types of obligations the
critical theories advanced in the earlier volumes. Its method is the same and its
scope can be appreciated from a brief sampling of the topics treated: Money Loans
and Deposits, Sales of Movables and Immovables, Agency, Maritime Transportation of Goods, Insurance and Suretyship The volume concludes with chapters on
the Modification and Discharge of Obligations, including a discussion of the Statute
of Limitations. The author again admirably succeeds in avoiding a mere compilation or encyclopedic recapitulation of the conflicts rules of the various legal systems.
He does not hesitate to give his scholarly estimate of the relative values or merits
of the competing rules. At times, however, the wealth of material to be presented
in such limited space does not permit such extensive criticism as that given, for
example, to the various conflicts theories regarding the Statute of Limitations.
4
The key to Dr. Rabel's critical approach has been given in his earlier volume
and appears in the Introductory Note to the present volume:
"Among the multitude of conflicts principles that, according to various claims,
should determine the law applicable to all contracts, only two have resisted
1.
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the test of critical analysis. These, indeed form an adequate groundwork. First,
the freedom of parties to choose the law applicable to their contract must be
recognized as a general rule without petty restraint. Second, in the absence of
such agreement, a contract should be governed by the law most closely connected
0
with its characteristic feature."
Dr. Rabel is no friend of the "scholastic doctrine" which "may invest the law of
the place of contracting with ineluctable force."0 His analysis of Continental law
and decisions and his criticism of American cases which seem to apply rather
mechanically the lex loci contractus rule provide the reflective reader with adequate
data on which to estimate the value of the "autonomy" theory. However hardened
we may be in allegiance to the Bealist-Restatement lex loci contractus rule, it must
be admitted that "the question of what law determines the validity of a contract...
is the most confused subject in the field of Conflict of Laws." 7 If the lex loci
contractus rule disguises or conceals in fact a latent but very real choice by the
court of the "intention" rule, it is time that we stripped off the disguise and considered where a frank adoption of the "intention" theory must lead us. The various
chapters on specific contract obligations in Dr. Rabel's present volume, particularly
those dealing with money loans and deposits will help in making that estimate.
The reviewer must resist the temptation to discuss the topics of the present
volume in detail. However, the short chapter on the Sale of Immovables and the
chapters on the Statute of Limitations illustrate the excellence of the author's
method and the cogency of his critique. Perhaps the average reader will find these
chapters most familiar and hence most interesting. The famous Holmesian limitation
on the lex situs rule with reference to contracts to convey land in another state
is applauded and the troublesome question with regard to the governing la, in
reference to covenants for title is carefully discussed.8 The author's excursus into
the nature of covenants running with the land in Anglo-American law should excite
the real property man.9 For here again is the ancient controversy between logic
and history.
Is the Statute of Limitations a matter of "procedure" and hence to be governed
by the lex fon or a matter of "substance" and thus governed by the kex contractus.
"Must we go again over all this territory?"' 1 asks Dr. Rabel; but he resigns himself to the task. He traces the history of the rule that the matter is one appertaining to the "remedy," and shows by his careful study of the concept of limitations
in other legal systems that analytically, much better reasons exist for the "substantive" view. 1 And to this reviewer it still seems unnecessary, in arriving at such a
10. Id. at 476.
11. Id. at 493.

conclusion, to call in aid the "realists" who affect to see in the lawyer's distinction
between matters of "substance" and matters of "remedy" nothing but a "nominalist"
sham-battle.

Dr. Rabel's work is unquestionably a contribution of major importance. It must
be consulted constantly by every careful student of the Conflict of Laws. It has
succeeded in pointing out defects in our American rules in this field. The compara5.
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tive method, however, though it may reveal o6 purely analytical grounds that other
systems of law have arrived at rules seemingly superior to our own, does not disclose how far and in what manner we may go about the substitution of those
"superior" rules for our "inferior" ones. If law is the product of history as well as
of logic, history cannot always yield to logic. The delicate task of grafting upon
the body of our law new rules approved in systems whose history differs from our
own remains after the scholar in Comparative Law has done his work.
EDWARD F. BARRETTl
Two
volumes. By Joseph Rasch. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Company, 1950. Pp.
cxxv, 794; xxv, 1615. $25.00.

THE NEW YORK LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

Despite anything in this review suggestive of the contrary, this is a fine piece of
work. The author is thoroughly conversant with his subject and has done a commendable job of research, correlation and exposition. And certainly his treatment
is comprehensive.
The first volume deals essentially with the substantive law of landlord and tenant
while the second is concerned primarily with summary proceedings. The book is
divided into five parts. The author first- discusses the tenant's remedies to acquire
initial possession of the demised premises, assignment and subletting, holdovers,
renewals and licenses. In part two are treated rent, deposits, taxes and water rights,
use and waste, alterations, signs, restrictions, fixtures, improvements, repairs, options
to purchase and insurance. The third part takes up the problems of conditions and
conditional limitations; termination by summary proceedings, eminent domain, destruction and surrender; the covenant of quiet enjoyment and eviction. In part
four the reader is led through the formalities of leasing. Part five treats in detail
summary proceedings, the statutory grounds therefor, the problems concerned with
parties, venue, and matters of practice from petition to redemption. There are
approximately 1500 pages of text supplemented by some 350 pages devoted to
tables of contents, statutes, cases cited and an index of 189 pages. One hundred
forms are included, covering pertinent clauses to leases, notices and pleadings in
summary proceedings.
Accepting the author's statement ip his preface that the book was written for the
practitioner, one must conclude that Mr. Rasch takes a dim view of the intellectual
capacity of his colleagues at the bar. For what the author has to say, he says three
times. The pattern of exposition evident in most of the book but particularly in
those parts devoted to the substantive law is this: a statement of the rule; quotations from cases stating the rule; a summary of the rule. While this, like all repetition, can at times become mildly irritating, it does have the ultimate effect of
leaving the reader in no doubt as to the point the author is making. Ambiguity
is reduced to a minimum and whatever the reaction of the practitioner, the law
student will be appreciative.
The author has his own ideas on organization. Thus the difference between a
lease and a license is not treated until Chapter 5, and tenancies other than estates
for years are postponed until the discussion of summary proceedings in Chapter 23.
A spot check of the index, however, indicates that it is quite good and the reader
should have no difficulty locating his topic.
t

Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame University College of Law.
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The main target of criticism in the book would seem to be the occasional inaccurate
statement which may tend to mislead. Examples of this are such declarations as "it
must be emphasized that a tenant is under an implied obligation to put, and to keep,
demised premises in tenantable repair"; 1 "when a tenant restores his possession to
the landlord, and consents to the landlord's reletting of the premises to another,
it has been held that these facts indicate a surrender and acceptance" ;2 and, "in
law there is only one way in which this election [to terminate a tenancy for breach
of condition subsequent] can be manifested. That is, by actual reentry."3 The
author knows better and a complete reading of the subject involved will dispel any
misapprehension but if the book is used only for reference, a limited reading may
be dangerous. Other statements may be misleading because they are too general.
For example, the statement of the measure of damages for breach of the landlord's
restrictive covenant; 4 and on the right to recover for property damage on breach
of the landlord's covenant to repair.5 In § 14740 we find the anomalous asertion
of a duty to exercise reasonable care coupled with liability only for wilful or
malicious damage. And in § 719, 7 a statement on the effect of a non-waiver clause
is confusing because of a failure to include the prerequisite of notice to the tenant.
On the other hand, the author treats particularly well the difficult subjects of
the respective liabilities of assignor and assignee, fixtures, conditional limitations,
and remedies for breach of the landlord's covenant to renew.
With the admonition, then, that the researcher read extensively on his problem
and not be content with any single statement appearing in one of the brief paragraphs into which the book is divided, the work can be recommended as an exceedingly useful tool in a field where such aids are not in superabundance. One final
word of caution, however, is in order. An advertising throw-away of the publisher
speaks of "its dear-cut discussion of the court-established principles applying to
ALL emergency rent situations. . .

."

If this suggests to the reader that Mr. Rasch

has covered the emergency rent law, the suggestion is false. The general nature of
a statutory tenancy has been indicated but the author expressly disclaims any
attempt to treat the emergency laws because of their transient nature.
Taous J. S.Nmt
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